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The Normative Source of Kantian Hypothetical Imperatives1 
 
*Published in International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20:5 (2012): 661-90 
 
 
Kant defines instrumental reason in terms of hypothetical imperatives which recommend 
adoption of the means necessDU\WRDQDJHQW¶VHQG0RUHVSHFLILFDOO\KHVWDWHVLQWKHGroundwork 
of the Metaphysic of Morals that µ[h]ypothetical imperatives declare a possible action to be 
practically necessary as a means to the attainment of something else that one wills (or that one may 
will)¶2  According to Kant, hypothetical imperatives are analytic propositions whereas the 
categorical imperative is an a priori, synthetic principle.3   
&RQWHPSRUDU\FRPPHQWDWRUVRIWHQLQYRNH.DQW¶VWKHRU\RIK\SRWKHWLFDOLPSHUDWLYHVWR
pinpoint defects within the volitional picture of agency provided by empiricist conceptions of 
LQVWUXPHQWDOUHDVRQ6LQFH%HUQDUG:LOOLDPV¶VHPLQDOSDSHUµInternal and External Reasons¶ 
many believe that in order for practical reasons to be both normative and motivational they must be 
OLQNHGWRDQDJHQW¶VH[LVWLQJVXEMHFWLYHPRWLYDWLRQDOVHW4  For many, the Humean picture of 
LQVWUXPHQWDOUHDVRQLVVDLGWREHVWIXOILOWKLVLQWHUQDOLVWUHTXLUHPHQWZKHUHDV.DQW¶VDFFRXQWRI
practical rationality is rejected on grounds of its supposed endorsement of external rather than 
internal reasons.  However, in µThe Normativity of Instrumental Reason¶5 Christine Korsgaard 
argues that Kantian principles of practical reason can satisfy the internalist requirement through 
.DQW¶V account of human rational agency.  Korsgaard contends that hypothetical and categorical 
imperatives share a common normative source in human rational agency, thus implying the unity of 
practical reason.  Indeed, the claim is that Kantian hypothetical imperatives presuppose a kind of 
moral commitment traditionally associated with the categorical imperative.  This moralised account 
of instrumental reason purports to show two things: first, Kantian norms of practical reason are 
internal not external reasons; second, this Kantian position as stated offers an attractive riposte of 




 7KLVSDSHUDUJXHVWKDWZHVKRXOGQRWDFFHSW.RUVJDDUG¶VUHDGLQg for two main reasons: 
ILUVW,DUJXHWKDWWKHGXDOLVPLQ.DQW¶VSUDFWLFDOSKLORVRSK\LVQHFHVVDU\IRUH[HJHWLFDOFRQVLVWHQF\
6HFRQGGHIHQGLQJ.DQW¶VGXDOLVWLFIUDPHZRUNKDVQRUPDWLYHVLJQLILFDQFHLQVRIDUDVLWSUHSDUHVIRU
the critical authority of moral reasoning over and above instrumental rationality.  Ultimately, it is 
LPSRUWDQWWRUHYLVLW.RUVJDDUG¶VDSSURDFKWRVKRZWKDWVKRXOGKHULQWHUSUHWDWLRQEHDFFHSWHG, we 
ULVNPLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHGLVWLQFWLYHSRZHURIWKHFDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYH¶Vconstraint on the 
subjective, self-regarding focus implicit in the instrumental use of reason.  ,QGHIHQGLQJ.DQW¶V
dualism in the practical domain my work finds allegiance with contemporary critiques of 
constructivist Kantianism, found in the work of John Hare, Patrick Kain, and Karl Ameriks.6  These 
WKUHHDXWKRUVKDYHFRUUHFWO\DUJXHGWKDWERWK.DQW¶VPHWDSK\VLFVDVZHOODVKLVGXDOLVPDUHFUXFLDO
for an accurate understanding of his practical philosophy.  However, despite my overall sympathy 
with their non-constrXFWLYLVWUHDGLQJP\LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVHHNVWRGHIHQG.DQW¶VGXDOLVWLFIUDPHZRUN
without the religious connotations endorsed by these three commentators.7   
 To support my principal arguments, my reading of Kantian hypothetical imperatives 
departs from KorsgDDUG¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRQtwo major points.  First, LQVWUXPHQWDOSUDFWLFDOUHDVRQ¶V
normative source is a combination of standards of practical efficacy as well as good theoretical 
cognition.  Aspects of theoretical reason contained in Kantian hypothetical imperatives have been 
inadequately explored, in part because the unity of practical reason tends to be assumed despite its 
inconsistency with .DQW¶VGXDOLVWLFSKLORVRSKLFDOIUDPHZRUNSecond, prudential or skilful 
normative standards of instrumental reason are independent from the categorical imperative.8  I 
claim that .DQW¶VDFFRXQWRIGHVLUHSUHVXSSRVHVUDWLRQDOFDSDFLWLHVWKDWDUHQRWWREHFRQIXVHGZLWK
rational norms of moral reasoning.  
 6HFWLRQV,DQG,,H[DPLQH.RUVJDDUG¶VUHDGLQJRI.DQWLDQLQVWUXmental reason.  I show that 
her worry about motivational scepticism and related agent-centred analysis of rational principles 
incur several exegetical problems.  These include confusing the analytic-synthetic distinction as 
well as conflating instrumental and pure practical reason.  Sections III and IV GHIHQG.DQW¶V
dualism between moral and instrumental reason by exposing how norms of empirical and 
theoretical cognition contribute to the normativity of instrumental reason.  This illustrates how, 
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unlike moral reasoning, instrumental willing presupposes a stance of openness and receptivity 
towards the external world.  Section V shows how the use of instrumental reason towards specific 
anthropocentric ends leads to a conflicted dynamic with the objective moral law of pure practical 
reason.  This supports the claim that principle of moral reason has a critical authority over and 
above instrumental reason. 
 
I. .RUVJDDUG¶V5HDGLQJ 
   
According to Kant, the principles of instrumental and moral reason take an imperatival form.  
He writes,  
 
$OOLPSHUDWLYHVDUHH[SUHVVHGE\DQ³ought´%\WKLVWKH\PDUNWKHUHODWLRQRIDQREMHFWLYHODZRI
reason to a will which is not necessarily determined by this law by virtue of its subjective 
constitution (the relation of necessitation).  They say that something would be good to do or to 
leave undone; only they say it to a will which does not always do a thing because it has been 
informed that this is a good thing to do.9   
 
Rational principles affect human agents through their charaFWHULVWLFµoughtness¶ necessity, or µto-
be-doneness¶  Both hypothetical and categorical imperatives share this prescriptive quality.  On a 
conventional reading, UHDVRQ¶VSUHVFULSWLYLW\LVH[SOLFDWHGZLWKUHIHUHQFHWR.DQW¶VGXDOLVWLF
philosophical system.10  Humans are only imperfectly rational given our unavoidable sensible 
features.  This means that principles of practical reason do not in general exercise full control over 
the human will.  Moreover, Kant stipulates that though all imperatives have practical necessity, 
ones of skill and prudence exert only subjective necessity whereas the categorical imperative has 
objective necessity.  The former imperatives are applicable to an agent given particular subjective 
ends, while the latter imperative pertains to all rational beings irrespective of their particular 
subjective ends.  Already this signals that the normativity of instrumental and moral reason is both 
different and separate based on the divergent character of their necessity. 
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.RUVJDDUG¶VLQWHUSUHWDtion departs from this more traditional reading in significant respects.  
Korsgaard contends that moral practical reason grounds the normativity of instrumental reason.11  
She reaches this conclusion through two interpretive strategies which I explain in more detail 
below.  First, she focuses on the common practical necessity and motivational force of the 
imperatival form; second, she emphasises how both hypothetical and categorical imperatives are 
constitutive of human autonomous rational agency.  At root, Korsgaard hopes to provide a 
moralised account of instrumental reason that complements her commitment to a liberal conception 
of the autonomous agent.   
)RU.RUVJDDUG.DQW¶VSULPDU\TXHVWLRQLQWKHGroundwork is how any imperative motivates 
agents to act.  Specifically, Korsgaard assumes that Kant tackles this question from the perspective 
of one fundamentally concerned about motivational scepticism; his analysis of all imperatives ± be 
they of skill, prudence, or morality ± allegedly begin from an inquiry into how normative principles 
RIUHDVRQPDQDJHWRµJULS¶DQDJHQW.  As mentioned above, %HUQDUG:LOOLDPV¶LQIOXHQWLDOYHUVLRQRI
LQWHUQDOLVPRXWOLQHVKRZQRUPDWLYHUHDVRQVPXVWFRUUHVSRQGWRDQDJHQW¶VVXEMHFWLYHPRWLYDWLRQDO
set in order to have motivational force.  This set may consist of existing beliefs, desires, or conative 
components; independent of these subjective elements normative reasons have no power to 
motivate an agent to act.  Reasons are normative and have motivational force not by virtue of their 
LQWULQVLFµULJKWQHVV¶ but because they become attached to an already existing set of subjective 
FRPPLWPHQWV,QWHUQDOLVPWKHUHIRUHDSSHDUVWRVROYHWKHSUREOHPRIUHDVRQ¶VPRWLYDWLQJIRUFHDQG
normativity without invoking any metaphysical frameworks outside the individual agent.  But in so 
doing, Williams argues that we would need to endorse a Humean ± rather than Kantian ± picture of 
human motivation.  Moreover, instrumental rationality would be the paradigmatic example of 
motivational internalism since the existence of such reasons is parasitic on the adoption of a 
subjective desiderative end. 
Korsgaard accepts the force of the internalist position but she is further preoccupied with 
deflecting the charge by some that Kant has an externalist conception of practical reason.12 
Korsgaard argues that normative principles of Kantian reason have motivational force by virtue of 
the necessary constitutive features of practical rational agency itself.  Motivating .RUVJDDUG¶V
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concern with the internalist/externalist debate is a deeper concern with moral scepticism: if moral 
principles are presupposed in our everyday use of instrumental rationality, moral reasons then must 
be both internal and motivating reasons.  
For Korsgaard, to will or be volitionally motivated towards an end necessarily involves the 
self-application of rational norms.  We are first-personally committed to an end if we will it; such 
willing necessarily involves the µinward, volitional act of prescribing the end along with the means 
it requires to yourself.¶13  In the case of means-end reasoning we apply the instrumental principle ± 
the rational normative command that µif you will the ends, you must will the means¶  In other 
words, Korsgaard argues that in addition to subjective volitional commitment, essential to all 
practical motivation is the recognition that normative rational principles apply unconditionally to all 
agents (as well as oneself).14  To be consistent with the internalist requirement, Korsgaard believes 
we subjectively endorse these normative, rational principles ± these principles are internal rather 
than external reasons.15   
On this account the first-personal endorsement of rational principles we give to ourselves 
amounts to a process by which we confer objective goodness onto a subjective end.  This differs 
IURP.DQW¶VRZQDEVWUDFWGHVFULSWLRQRIK\SRWKHWLFDOLPSHUDWLYHV2WKHUWKDQWKHUHFRJQLWLRQWKDW
humans employ instrumental reason towards broad ends involving technical skill and prudence, 
Kant remains silent on how individuals define goodness or value in terms of specific ends.  But for 
Korsgaard to will an end implies that an individual does not simply desire or will an object, but 
actively examines and endorses the substantive value of that end in accordance with a rational 
principle, where we can judge this end as a good thing to will.  To support this claim Korsgaard 
must inject the instrumental principle with substantive, evaluative content.  She states, µthe 
normative force of the instrumental principle does seem to depend on our having a way to say to 
ourselves of some ends that there are reasons for them, that they are good.¶16   
7KLVOHDGVWR.RUVJDDUG¶VVHFRQGLQWHUSUHWLYHVWUDWHJ\:KHQJRRGness is conferred onto an 
object of our choice, we see how this act of choice involves our giving ourselves rational principles 




goodness of the means is not analytically contained within the willing of an end; rather, the search 
for the means to an end leads to a regress towards the normative features which are constitutive of 
rational agency:  
 
[F]or the instrumental principle to provide you with a reason, you must think that the fact that you 
will an end is a reason IRUWKHHQG,W¶VQRWH[DFWO\WKDWWKHUHKDVWREHDfurther UHDVRQLW¶VMXVWWKDW
you must take the act of your own will to be normative for you.  And of course this cannot mean 
merely that you are going to pursue the end.  It means that your willing the end gives it a normative 
status for you, that your willing the end in a sense makes it good.  The instrumental principle can 
only be normative if we take ourselves to be capable of giving laws to ourselves ± RULQ.DQW¶VRZQ
phrase, if we take our own wills to be legislative.17 
 
To summarise .RUVJDDUG¶VDUJXPHQWLVDVIROORZVWKHLQVWUXPHQWDOSULQFLSOHDUWLFXODWHVKRZ, when 
we are volitionally committed to an end which we deem subjectively valuable, we are also 
committed to the means towards that end.  But this leads us to a further regress from the act of 
conferring normative value onto an end to the normativity and value of self-legislative, autonomous 
rational agency.  In willing the means to our end we recognise that what we actually normatively 
endorse is the objective rational principle which expresses our self-legislating, rational agency.   
In the Sources of Normativity Korsgaard inverts the order of this regress argument: 
 
The hypothetical imperative tells us that if we will an end, we have a reason to will the means to 
WKDWHQG7KLVLPSHUDWLYH>«@LVQRWEDVHGRQWKHUHFRJQLWLRQRIDQRUPDWLYHIDFWRUWUXWKEXW
simply on the nature of the will.  To will an end, rather than just wishing for it or wanting it, is to 
set yourself to be its cause.  And to set yourself to be its cause is to set yourself to take the available 
means to get it.  So the argument goes from the nature of the rational will to a principle which 
describes a procedure according to which such a will must operate and from there to an application 




Here, Korsgaard begins with an analysis of autonomous agency and rational will and moves to 
instrumental reasoning.  When one examines further why we value rational agency, it is because we 
value our autonomy and how we as rational agents legislate and create laws for ourselves.  Thus, 
the means to our ends are normative only insofar as they reflect the normativity of what it is to be 
an autonomous rational agent.  Based on how the will functions, rational agents automatically 
choose and confer value upon subjectively chosen ends according to the criteria of objective, self-
given laws.19   
5HJDUGOHVVRIZKLFKDUJXPHQWDWLYHVWUDWHJ\VKHXOWLPDWHO\HQGRUVHV.RUJDDUG¶VDQDO\VLVRI
instrumental reason hinges on what she views as the constitutive features of Kantian rational 
agency.  The nature of rational agency means that maxims aim to conform to the instrumental 
principle.20  This is because principles of practical reason µdo not represent external restrictions on 
our actions, whose power to motivate us is therefore inexplicable, but instead describe the 
procedures involved in autonomous willing¶  Moreover, µthey also function as normative or 
guiding principles, because in following these procedures we are guiding ourselves.¶21  Based on 
.RUVJDDUG¶VFRQVWLWXWLYHDFFRXQWDll practical principles ± and therefore both hypothetical and 
categorical imperatives ± are at once descriptions of the procedures of our rational agency, as well 
as prescriptive standards of how our rational agency should function.  
Conventionally, Kantian autonomy is read as identical with the good will which accords with 
the moral law.22  Kant writes in the Groundwork 
 
An absolutely good will, whose principle must be a categorical imperative, will therefore, being 
undetermined in respect of all objects, contain only the form of willing, and that as autonomy.  In 
other words, the fitness of the maxim of every good will to make itself a universal law is itself the 
sole law which the will of every rational being spontaneously imposes on itself without basing it on 
any impulsion or interest.23   
 
If Korsgaard accepts what Kant says here, her claim that the instrumental principle requires us to 
µgive oneself a law¶24 must mean that instrumental reasoning in fact necessitates individuals to 
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behave in a morally autonomous sense, typically associated with categorical willing.  The µmature 
Kantian view¶ writes Korsgaard, µtraces both instrumental reason and moral reason to a common 
normative source: the autonomous self-government of the rational agent.¶25  Autonomous self-
government therefore describes and binds all agents, whether their endorsed ends are moral and 
objective or instrumental and subjective.  If this is true, instrumental reasons ± and more 
importantly moral reasons ± would be internal reasons that are both normative and motivational 
since they reflect how it is to be a being that wills maxims as self-given laws.   
.RUVJDDUG¶VLQWHUSUHWLYHDQDO\VLVRI.DQWLDQLQVWUXPHQWDOUHDVRQWKHUHIRUHDSSHDUVFDSDEOH
of responding neatly to both the FKDUJHRIH[WHUQDOLVPDJDLQVW.DQW¶VDFFRXQWRISUDFWLFDOUHDVRQ 
and the threat of moral scepticism.  The constitutive features of unconditioned human autonomy 
answer questions surrounding the normative and motivational force common to both instrumental 
and moral reasons.  Moreover, .RUVJDDUG¶VDFFRXQWRI.DQWLDQLQVWUXPHQWDOUHDVRQUHIOHFWs her 
general desire to ground all willing ± whether hypothetical or categorical ± in the moral 
requirements of autonomous rational agency, thus responding to the moral sceptic.  Even when we 
reason instrumentally, we engage in our capacity for legislative PRUDODXWRQRP\RQ.RUVJDDUG¶V
account the latter is simply a constitutive feature of our rational agency in general.  It is precisely 
this agent-centred focus and regress strategy which allows Korsgaard to claim that hypothetical 
imperatives require the legislative demands of the categorical imperative.   
 
II. Analytic-Synthetic Distinction 
 
As Korsgaard sees it, the nature of Kantian agency ± of the autonomy which is constitutive of 
the will ± implies that individual maxims are automatically willed as universal law.  This suggests 
that Korsgaard equates the normativity of all practical reasons with the norms of morality.  µTo say 
that moral laws are the laws of autonomy is not to say that our autonomy somehow requires us to 
restrict ourselves in accordance with them¶ Korsgaard writes, µbut rather to say that they are 
constitutive of autonomous action.  Kant thinks that in so far as we are autonomous, we just do will 
our maxims as universal laws.¶26 The categorical imperative is not a law that we may or may not 
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apply; rather, Korsgaard claims that the universality requirement of the moral law is contained 
within all maxim construction ± even in the non-moral pursuit of subjectively desired ends.  If you 
are a sort of being who acts on maxims, you are therefore a rational being that always makes, and 
acts in accordance with, universal moral law.  
$WURRW.RUVJDDUG¶VXQGHUO\LQJZRUU\about a self-standing principle of instrumental 
rationality seems to be the potentially morally indigestible consequences which may follow from it.  
On the view she wishes to challenge, a principle of instrumental rationality can function 
independently of the universality requirements of the moral law.  To use an example given by G. A. 
Cohen, it would be like saying that the Mafioso who adopts an end to kill someone is in some way 
committed to carrying out the means.27  For the sake of consistency, this action would be both 
normative and rational; and the Mafioso is not necessarily required to test their maxim for its moral 
permissibility.RUVJDDUG¶VPRUDOLVLQJFRQFOXVLRQWULHVWRDYRLGWKHVHKDUPIXOFRQVHTXHQFHVLIDOO
rational principles lead to the constitutive features of morally autonomous rational agency, then the 
Mafioso who adopts this end would automatically will this maxim to kill as universal law, and 
would be subsequently required to abandon such an objectionable end.28  Conjoining moral 
endorsement of rational principles with subjective volitional commitment seemingly avoids any 
extreme detachment of instrumental reason from moral assessment, and allows these moralised 
evaluations to be transferred from the means to the end itself.29 
%XWWRDGGUHVVWKLVZRUU\RIGHWDFKPHQWWKURXJK.RUVJDDUG¶VVWUDWHJ\GRHVVHHP
problematic for two reasons.  First, her reading cannot make coherent sense of the *URXQGZRUN¶V
analytic-synthetic distinction.  This should indicate that her account of the normative source of 
instrumental reason is mistaken.  Second, she conflates together prudential and moral reasoning and 
therefore reduces the full moral force of the categorical imperative.  The first problem I address in 
this section, the latter I discuss after advancing my own interpretive account of the normative 
source of hypothetical imperatives.   
.RUJDDUG¶Vagent-centred interpretation rests on a generous understanding of analyticity.  
Kant argues that hypothetical imperatives are analytic, µfor in my willing of an object as an effect 
there is already conceived the causality of myself as an acting cause ± that is, the use of means; and 
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from the concept of willing an end the imperative merely extracts the concept of actions necessary 
to this end¶30  On a straightforward reading of this passage the means are analytically contained 
within willing the end.  But Korsgaard adopts a different strategy: she extends the analyticity of 
hypothetical imperatives to incorporate the constituents of µagency¶.  She alleges that the 
constituent features of rational agency ± not the predicate, µwilling the end¶ ± perform the analytic 
work in Kantian instrumental reason.  If we analyse the constituents of µrational agency¶, we will be 
able to extract the claim µought to ensure that if she has an end she takes the necessary means to 
it¶31  Korsgaard claims that  
 
[t]o will an end just is to will to cause or realize the end, hence to will to take the means to the end.  
This is the sense in which the [instrumental] principle is analytic.  The instrumental principle is 
constitutive of an act of the will.  If you do no follow it, you are not willing the end at all.32   
 
In other words, the normativity of instrumental reason relies on what it means to be an agent who 
wills rather than what it means to will an end.33  Korsgaard understands the analytic claim, µif you 
ZLOOWKHHQGV\RXQHFHVVDULO\ZLOOWKHPHDQV´WREHDQHVVentLDOSDUWRIWKHDQDO\VLVRIµrational 
agent¶.34  Following from this analytic truth she suggests that rational principles ± be they 
instrumental or moral ± apply unconditionally to all agents.   
In order for this to make sense we would have to grant Korsgaard a looser, non-Kantian 
notion of analytic truth which claims µthat it is analytic that any agent ought to do what rational 
agents do¶35  Korsgaard seems to have this non-Kantian account in mind, as she writes: 
 
The model suggests that the normativity of the ought expresses a demand that we should emulate 
more perfect rational beings (possibly including our own noumenal selves) whose own conduct is 
not guided by normative principles at all, but instead describable in a set of logical truths.36 
 




[S]ince we still do make choices and have the attitude that what we choose is good in spite of our 
LQFDSDFLW\WRILQGWKHXQFRQGLWLRQHGFRQGLWLRQRIWKHREMHFW¶VJRRGQHVVLQWKLVHPSLULFDOUHJUHVV
upon the conditions, it must be that we are supposing that rational choice itself makes its object 
good.37 
 
Thus, it is possible to derive the moral law analytically if we were to DGRSW.RUVJDDUG¶VFRQFHSWLRQ
of analytic truth.  If we were to abstract from the material and conditional nature of hypothetical 
imperatives, we would be eventually left with the unconditional form of the categorical imperative, 
especially since both are contained within an analysis of the constitutive features of autonomous 
rational agency.38  µRationality, as Kant conceives it¶ she writes, µis the human plight that gives rise 
to the necessity of making free choices ± not one of the options which we might choose or reject.¶39    
WHVKRXOGEHKHVLWDQWDERXWDGRSWLQJ.RUVJDDUG¶Vlooser conception of analytic truth.  I take 
LWWKDW.RUVJDDUG¶VUHJUHVVVWUDWHJ\UHOLHVRQDQRWLRQRIDQDO\WLFLW\DVRQHRIORJLFDOHQWDLOPHQW
This may cohere with some remarks Kant makes in the first Critique,40 but it cannot be said to 
reflect .DQW¶Vnarrower definition of analyticity in the Groundwork.  There analytic truth is defined 
as strict logical containment: meaning that the predicate is contained in its subject.  µ:LOOLQJDQHQG¶
contains the concept that one µought to will the necessary means¶41 the adoption of an empirical 
end entails the means towards that end.  More specifically, willing the means ± or a hypothetical 
imperative ± is analytically contained within willing the end.  By contrast the categorical imperative 
is an a priori, synthetic proposition that is µconcerned, not with the reason for performing the act of 
will, but with the cause which produces the object)¶42  .DQW¶VLQVWUXPHQWDOSULQFLSOHLVDQDO\WLF
insofar as it applies only if you have adopted an end; in other words, the applicability of the 
principle is conditional on that adopted end.  By implication, the instrumental principle acquires its 
practical content entirely from the adoption of a desired end, not the meaning or constituents of 
agency: without that end, the instrumental principle would have no evaluative, material, or 
practical content.  And more importantly, the analyticity of the instrumental principle relies on one 
willing an end whether or not its material content is judged good or bad from the perspective of 
morality or self-legislating rational agency.  
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.DQW¶VPDLQWKHRUHWLFDOconcern in the Groundwork, and indeed throughout his practical 
philosophy, is to show how synthetic principles, such as the moral law, are possible.  This is 
particularly since the moral law cannot be derived from any empirical intuition.  Kant therefore 
does not share .RUVJDDUG¶VEDVLFSRLQWVRIGHSDUWXUH: it is doubtful that Kant is similarly worried 
about SUDFWLFDOUHDVRQ¶VPRWLYDWLRQDOJULSRQDJHQWVQRULVKHSUHRFFXSLHGZLWKGLVSURYLQJPRUDO
scepticism.43  By virtue of its conditioned reliance on the empirical world for practical content 
hypothetical imperatives are fundamentally less problematic to account for than the categorical 
imperative.44  Kant seems to set aside the principle of instrumental reason as a straightforward 
principle which demands no extra philosophical manoeuvring;45 the brunt of the analytic work is 
shouldered by the adoption of a subjectively willed end.  Since hypothetical imperatives are 
analytic, instrumental reason must have a conditioned as opposed to an unconditioned normative 




Korsgaard endorses a wide reading of analyticity because she hopes to avoid the synthetic a 
priori.  At root this is to evade .DQW¶VGXDOLVWLFIUDPHZRUNLQKLVSUDFWLFDOSKLORVRSK\± a common 
PRYHVLQFH5DZOV¶GLVPLVVDORI.DQW¶VGXDOLVPVLQA Theory of Justice. 46  However, these dualisms 
SOD\DFUXFLDOUROHLQ.DQW¶VSUDFWLFDOSKLORVRSK\  To recognise this we must understand two 
things: first, that instrumental reason shares much with theoretical reason; second, moral reasoning 
must be independent from instrumental reason in order to be able to exercise critical authority over 
it.  We will see this more fully if the theoretically rational aspects of instrumental reason are 
explored. 
Through his dualisms Kant legitimises reason in both its theoretical and practical use and in 
turn, he carves out a sphere of instrumental practical reason which is neither pure practical reason 
nor pure theoretical cognition, but somewhere in between.  For Kant instrumental reason is 
µpractical¶ in the sense that through its intentionality some kind of change is produced in the 
phenomenal world.  However, instrumental rationality is connected more closely to theoretical 
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reason than pure practical reason in many respects and therefore cannot be conflated with the moral 
legislation of the latter.  Embedded within instrumental desires or impulses are aspects of 
theoretical cognition which also form part of the normativity of instrumental rationality.  First, 
desiderative ends already presuppose as well as integrate a conceptual grasp of the sensible object 
in question.  Second, the means-end connection ± where human possibility or powers are evaluated 
and judged ± presupposes the active synthesis of disparate empirical experience and concepts into 
laws of nature.   
Common among both intellectual components is the use and application of theoretical 
cognition in order to formulate situationally appropriate principles of practical action.  Theoretical 
reason therefore becomes µpractical¶ when it is animated by the faculty of desire and subsequently 
outlines means and ends based on possible experience.  In a crucial passage from the second 
Critique Kant writes, µ>Z@hether the causality of the will is adequate for the reality of the objects or 
not is left to the theoretical principles of reason to estimate, this being an investigation into the 
possibility of objects of volition, the intuition of which is accordingly no component of the practical 
problem.¶47  This suggests that instrumental reason is theoretical knowledge animated by impulse or 
desire, resulting in the generation and execution of guiding practical rules.  As Beck correctly 
identifies, Kant suggests that instrumental reason should be understood as µtheoretical reason which 
is only extrinsically and contingently practical¶48  By contrast, the moral law as an unconditional 
practical law is discoverable by µa reason that is intrinsically practical¶49 
Overall Kantian instrumental reason integrates different elements from both ancient and 
modern philosophical traditions.  For Aristotle the irrational parts of the soul are ensconced within a 
broader rational order; passional elements thus possess a propensity towards the rational.  
Desiderative and emotional parts of the soul are µreceptive to reason¶ and can µparticipate in reason, 
in the sense that it is submissive and obedient to it¶50  By contrast, the modern viewpoint typically 
detaches inclination from reason: reason becomes subservient to the dictates of passion or natural 
self-preservation.  According to this latter picture, human inclinations are unreceptive to rational 
cognition or instruction.  Or in the case of Hume, these rational capacities become naturalised: 
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practical reason ± its principles and judgements ± are rooted in sympathetic or social propensities 
instinctive to humans.   
For Kant inclinations can never qualify as truly µrational¶ in the Aristotelian sense.  This is 
because stringent criteria differentiate moral practical reason ± the purely rational ± from non-moral 
functions of reason (theoretical and instrumental).  Human volitional propensities and their 
direction through the instrumental use of reason remain rooted in, receptive to, and conditioned by, 
the causally governed natural world.  Moreover, the desiderative elements of instrumental 
rationality have an uneasy dynamic vis-à-vis moral reason unlike its relative cooperation in the 
Aristotelian soul.   
Yet by the same token, the cognitive component to instrumental reason is not subservient to 
its conative counterpart as is typical of modern conceptions of practical reason.  The Aristotelian 
GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQDQLPDODQGKXPDQSDVVLRQVFDQKHOSH[SODLQ.DQW¶VSRLQW)RU$ULVWRWOHthe 
souls of both animals and humans contain an appetitive component which responds to sensory 
experience: this is a state of passive receptivity to the external, sensory world.  But unlike animals 
human passions incorporate active quasi-judgements or states of mind which direct us towards 
specific objects in particular circumstances.  Thus, on the one hand, human passions are 
intrinsically receptive: external sensory experience is required in order to provoke some kind of 
passional response.51  Yet, on the other hand, intentional action for Aristotle results from a close 
interaction of receptive passional and active intellectual features.  Human purposive action 
therefore results from the modification and active direction of the passions by the apprehensive 
capacities of the intellect.  The active input of the intellect is the crucial differentiating feature 
between human passions and animal appetite, which dictates accordingly $ULVWRWOH¶VIXQFWLRQDO
placement of human essence above animals on a hierarchical scale of beings in Nicomachean Ethics 
1.7.   
/LNH$ULVWRWOH¶VIXQFWLRQDOKLHUDUFK\.DQW¶VGXDOLVWLFYLVLRQRIKXPDQQDWXUHLPSRVHVOLPLWV
on human beings from below (that of nature and animals) and above (that of a purely rational, 
omnipotent being).52  This dualism also draws upon a distinction between the desires involved in 




That which can be determined by inclination (sensible impulse, stimulus) would be animal choice 
(arbitrium brutum).  Human choice, however, is a choice that can indeed be affected but not 
determined by impulses, and is therefore of itself (apart from an acquired proficiency of reason) not 
pure but can still be determined to actions by pure will.53 
 
Animals cannot unify their appetitive needs through active thought so as to achieve a degree of 
deliberative distance from inclination.  By contrast, human receptivity to sensible phenomena 
simultaneously provokes the cognitive capacity for imagination.  We necessarily draw upon this 
capacity of theoretical reason when we desire, will, or choose a particular end out of the conceptual 
unity encompassed within the thinking individual.  This cognitive activity introduces a crucial 
element of human rational control over inclination absent in animals.54  
Kant integrates rational activity into means-end reasoning in two distinct but related ways.  
First, Kant has a cognitivist conception of desire; this is evident in his reference to the concept.  In 
the first Critique WKHµFRQFHSW¶ refers to the active process of thought representation, whereby our 
sensible intuitions must conform to the categories of the understanding.  Theoretical knowledge of 
objects is possible through our sensible receptivity in relation to only empirically given 
phenomena.55  The mind is naturally receptive to empirical data; such data then conforms 
necessarily to a priori forms of intuition, space and time.  7KXVWKHµFRQFHSW¶RI phenomenal 
objects can never extend beyond these conditions; we can know only appearances, never the 
essences of things in themselves.   
Kant incorporates this notion of µconcept¶ into his account of the desiderative faculty: µThe 
faculty of desire in accordance with concepts, insofar as the ground determining it to action lies 
within itself and not in its object, is called a faculty to do or to refrain from doing as one pleases¶56  
He states in the Critique of Practical Reason, µ[g]ood and evil [are] always appraised by reason and 
hence through concepts, which can be universally communicated, not through mere feeling, which 
is restricted to individual subjects and their receptivity¶57  0RUHRYHUµ>L@f the concept of the good is 
not to be derived from an antecedent practical law but, instead, is to serve as its basis, it can be only 
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the concept of something whose existence promises pleasure and determines the causality of the 
subject, that is, the faculty of desire, to produce it¶58  Which representations of objects are 
subjectively pleasurable cannot be determined a priori;59 only after experience is accumulated can 
specific representations be seen as good in a subjective, hedonistic sense.  But even more 
fundamentally, the determination of the hedonistically good and evil itself involves theoretical 
concepts, judgements or tools which supplement sensibly given experience and are distinctive to 
humans.60  Thus, for Kant, bound up with the desiderative faculty is a necessary conceptual 
apparatus: reason is always present in inclinations as the latter cannot even be formed without the 
prior employment of theoretical cognition.61  
This leads to my second point.  Instrumental reason assesses physical possibilities or 
constraints in the practical context.  Aggregated empirical experience is utilised to consider how the 
analytic means-end relationship can be realised or hindered.62  Indeed, the very notion of experience 
presupposes this process: human understanding spontaneously apprehends, associates, recognises, 
and reproduces sensibly-given appearances in accordance with a law-like form.63  Means-end 
UDWLRQDOLW\FDQQRWIXQFWLRQZLWKRXWWKHRUHWLFDOUHDVRQ¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQDQGFRPSLODWLRQRIGLVSDUDWH
experiential facts into practically usable empirical laws, which may hinder human desiderative 
possibilities accordingly.  Kant affirms this close connection between instrumental reason and the 
understanding in the second Critique: 
 
Subsumption of an action possible to me in the sensible world under a pure practical law does not 
concern the possibility of the action as an event in the sensible world; for it belongs to the 
theoretical use of reason to appraise that possibility in accordance with the law of causality, a pure 
concept of the understanding for which reason has schema in sensible intuition.64 
 
In other words, instrumental reason falls partly under the normative domain of theoretical reason: 
the understanding generates causal laws which help determine the physical possibilities of realising 
a desired object.  Consequently, it is up to the theoretically rational components embedded in the 
desiderative faculty to recognize physical constraints, ensuring that the means to a desired object ± 
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and the object itself ± UHIOHFWFDUHIXOFRQVLGHUDWLRQRILQWHUYHQLQJOLPLWVEDVHGRQRQH¶V
understanding of the natural world.  Inclination can therefore have an intermediate, not immediate, 
LQIOXHQFHRQKXPDQDFWLRQLWDOZD\VLQYROYHVWKHRUHWLFDOUHDVRQ¶VSUH- and post-reflection on 
possible empirical constraints or miscellaneous causal connections.  The imagination can redirect or 
GHWHUDQDJHQW¶V desire away from a chosen object accordingly in response to these possible 
phenomenal restrictions.  Indeed, if one fails to respond in a situationally appropriate way the agent 
has either an insufficient awareness of their surroundings or failed to acquire the relevant and 
necessary practical experience.   
 
 
IV. Empirical, not Moral Laws 
 
7KHGLVFXVVLRQVRIDUKLQWVDWZKHUH,EHOLHYH.RUVJDDUG¶VDFFRXQWJRHVDVWUD\7KH
dichotomy implicit in Korsgaard ± either instrumental and pure practical reason must share the 
same normative source or instrumental reason fails to qualify as practical reason at all ± ignores 
.DQW¶VVXEWOHLQFOXVLRQRIWKHRUHWLFDOO\UDWLRnal elements in the faculty of desire.  The first 
implication of my reading is that Kantian instrumental reason involves a mixture of theoretically 
and practically rational components.  Kant confirms this explicitly in the Critique of the Power of 
Judgement:  
 
For even if the will follows no other principles than those by means of which the understanding has 
insight into the possibility of the object in accordance with them, as mere laws of nature, then the 
proposition which contains the possibility of the object through the causality of the faculty of 
choice may still be called a practical proposition, yet it is not at all distinct in principle from the 
theoretical propositions concerning the nature of things, but must rather derive its own content from 
the latter in order to exhibit the representation an object in reality.  Practical propositions, 
therefore, the content of which concerns merely the possibility of a represented object (through 
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voluntary action), are only applications of a complete theoretical cognition and cannot constitute a 
special part of a science.65 
 
Importantly, the will in means-end rationality is marked by a certain dependency: in these situations 
the will seeks ends which do not originate in pure practical reason.  Accumulated empirical 
experiences and theoretical knowledge help inform and direct the faculty of desire towards 
subjective ends.  Ultimately, the fundamental distinction between the subjection of the will (that of 
instrumental reason) and the subjection of nature (that of moral reasoning) lies in whether 
representations of desired objects of nature derived by theoretical means, intrude on practical 
choice.66   
Attention to the theoretical normative source of instrumental reason brings into sharper relief 
how in the means-end case Kant is concerned primarily with empirical ± not moral ± constraints.  
The normativity of instrumental reason is partly constituted by the correct application of empirical 
laws ± not the moral law of autonomous willing.  Although the means-end relationship will vary 
depending on the contingently willed end, the relevant empirical law is nonetheless formally 
contained within such willing.  As we saw in Section I Korsgaard argues that the instrumental 
principle requires making universal law for oneself.67  Yet this directly contradicts what Kant says 
in the second Critique: 
 
All practical principles that presuppose an object (matter) of the faculty of desire as the determining 
ground of the will are, without exception, empirical and furnish no practical laws%\³WKHPDWWHU
RIWKHIDFXOW\RIGHVLUH´,XQGHUVWDQGDQREMHFWZKRVHUHDOLW\LVGHVLUHG1RZ when desire for this 
object precedes the practical rule and is the condition of its becoming a principle, then I say (first) 
that this principle is in that case always empirical.68 
 
For Kant principles of instrumental reason are subjective and contingent; they depend on its 
desiderative and empirical components, resulting in a normative source which is neither pure 
theoretical nor pure practical reason.   
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Instrumental reasons are necessary only after an object has been represented and its 
principles can never stand independently of that representation.  Whereas the principle of pure 
practical reason ± the moral law ± must be obeyed even in light of opposing inclinations, 
hypothetical imperatives derive their necessity only from the conditional and particular volitional 
circumstances and can easily change should inclinations point elsewhere.  Kant writes,  
 
[F]or an action necessary merely in order to achieve an arbitrary purpose can be considered as in 
itself contingent, and we can always escape from the precept if we abandon the purpose; whereas an 
unconditioned command does not leave it open to the will to do the opposite at its discretion and 
therefore alone carries with it that necessity which we demand from a law.69   
 
Principles of instrumental reason reflect the transience of human desiderative needs, as illustrated in 
FDVHVZKHUHWKHUHTXLUHGPHDQVWRRQH¶VFKRVHQHQGSURYHVWREHHLWKHUXQSDODWDEOHRULQIHDVLEOHWR
the human agent.70  In the case of means-end deliberation practical reason can only issue principles, 
rules, or recommendations ± never laws ± because phenomenal considerations (and thus, theoretical 
cognitive features) must be given due weight.  Hence why principles of instrumental reason are 
conceived as hypothetical imperatives: these come into being only after a represented object and 
empirical considerations determine the will.    
If I am right about the conditional normative source in the instrumental use of reason, what 
follows is a conception of practical necessitation that is manifestly weaker than, and indeed unlike, 
the categorical, law-like demands of moral reason.  Korsgaard minimises this issue of dissimilar 
practical necessitation by suggesting that all LPSHUDWLYHVVKDUHWKHVDPHSUHVFULSWLYHµRXJKWQHVV¶
However, Kant states explicitly that, as dependent on the phenomenal world the µoughtness¶ of 
hypothetical imperatives represents the subjective necessity of the will unlike the objective 
necessity of the categorical imperative.  Instrumental choice must apply and consider the causality 
of those empirical laws generated by the understanding; by implication, hypothetical imperatives 
are principles that can only recommend, not categorically demand, the appropriate practical action 
to the will.71  Even the terms Kant uses to describe the different principles of practical reason 
 20 
  
express their dissimilar necessitation.  The practical principles that guide us towards instrumental 
UHDVRQ¶V ends of technical skill and happiness, he classifies as µrules of skill or counsels of 
prudence¶72; both are µprinciples of the will¶73 as opposed to the unconditioned and objective 
µcommands (laws) of morality¶74   
 .DQW¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHKHWHURQRPRXVZLOOKHOSVFODULI\WKLVSRLQW.  In a lengthy passage 
from the Groundwork Kant explains how represented, desired objects combine with empirical laws 
of nature to determine the heteronomous will: 
 
Wherever the object determines the will ± whether by means of inclination, as in the principle of 
personal happiness, or by means of reason directed to objects of our possible volitions generally, as 
in the principle of perfection ± the will never determines itself immediately by the thought of an 
action, but only by the impulsion which the anticipated effect of the action exercises on the will: ³I 
ought to do something because I will something else´  And the basis for this must be yet a further 
law in me as a subject, whereby I necessarily will this ³something else´ ± which law, in turn 
requires an imperative to impose limits on this maxim.  The impulsion supposed to be exercised on 
the will of the subject, in accordance with his natural constitution, by the idea of a result to be 
attained by his own powers belongs to the nature of the subject ± whether to his sensibility (his 
inclinations and taste) or to his understanding and reason, whose operation on an object is 
accompanied by satisfaction in virtue of the special equipment of their nature ± and consequently, 
speaking strictly, it is nature which would make the law.  This law, as a law of nature, not only must 
be known and proved by experience and therefore is in itself contingent and consequently unfitted 
to serve as an apodeictic rule of action such as a moral rule must be, but it is always merely 
heteronomy of the will: the will does not give itself the law, but an alien impulsion does so through 
WKHPHGLXPRIWKHVXEMHFW¶VRZQQDWXUHDVWXQHGIRULWVUHFHSWLRQ75 
 
Kant suggests that the normative principle of instrumental reason can be partly sourced in the 
theoretical laws of nature; more emphatically, this principle does not entail the moral law.  In this 
case the µwill is subject¶ to the laws of nature, as opposed to µa nature which is subject to a will¶ for 
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µin the former the objects must be the causes of the representations that determine the will¶76  When 
Kant argues that the instrumental use of reason presupposes a conception of oneself as an acting 
cause, he is not arguing that all practical agency stems from the pure autonomous and moral will 
[Wille].  Rather the will as free choice [Willkür] functions as the efficient cause to practical action.  
By µefficient cause¶ Kant means that we actively see how our free choice [Willkür] is connected to 
desiderative ends within a causal, means-end connection; we have ascertained WKHZLOO¶VDGHTXDF\
to effect change in the phenomenal world as informed by a combination of empirical knowledge 
and desiderative conditions.   
Yet the will conceived of as DQµefficient cause¶ does not obliterate human agency in any 
way.  As argued so far, the human understanding actively collates particular ideas/concepts into a 
law-like form.  This is applicable to the practical context because reflecting on the causal 
possibilities towards a desired end reveals µa further law in me as a subject¶  Particularly in the case 
of  morally indifferent actions reason alerts us that we must apply another law which regulates part 
of our dual nature ± as sensibly driven, imperfectly rational beings who are open to, and function 
within, a natural, mechanistic environment.77  Both laws of nature and the moral law are practically 
relevant to the human agent VLQFHERWKFRUUHVSRQGDQGDSSO\WRGLIIHUHQWDVSHFWVRIKXPDQLW\¶VGXDO
constitution.  By implication, through the very recognition of which law is salient and applicable to 
the particular circumstance individuals demonstrate a deliberative, spontaneous component which, 
on the one hand, progresses beyond the instinctual, unreflective activity of animals, and on the 
other, is bound and limited by the inescapable experience of human rational contingency.   
Thus Korsgaard is partly right to say that when one actively chooses [Willkür] an end in the 
instrumental use of reason one does indeed apply a law to oneself ± but crucially this refers not to 
the moral law of autonomous willing, but to theoretically informed principles which become 
practical by virtue of their attachment to an end set by the faculty of desire.  From the vantage point 
RIKXPDQLW\¶VSDUWLDOO\VHQVLEOHQDWXUHWKHcausal laws of nature are perfectly valid; from the 
viewpoint of our intelligible, noumenal counterpart, these empirical laws are merely impure 
practical rules or recommendations owing to their inherent reliance on phenomenal nature to fulfil 
our subjective desires.   
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Hypothetical imperatives of instrumental reason are therefore normative insofar that they 
DSSHDOWRWKHVHQVLEOHHPSLULFDOVLGHRIKXPDQLW\¶VLPSHUIHFWO\UDWLRQDOFRQVWLWXWLRQ.DQW
confirms this point explicitly in the second Critique:   
 
The human being is a being with needs insofar as he belongs to the sensible world, and to this 
extent his reason certainly has a commission from the side of his sensibility which it cannot refuse, 
to attend to its interest and to form practical maxims with a view to happiness in this life and, where 
possible, in a future life as well.  But he is nevertheless not so completely an animal as to be 
indifferent to all that reason says on its own and to use reason merely as a tool for the satisfaction of 
his needs as a sensible being.  For, that he has reason does not at all raise him in worth above mere 
animality if reason is to serve him only for the sake of what instinct accomplishes for animals; 
reason would in that case be only a particular mode nature had used to equip the human being with 
the same end to which it has destined animals, without destining him to a higher end.  No doubt 
once this arrangement of nature has been made for him he needs reason in order to take into 
consideration at all times his well-being and woe.78 
 
Norms of instrumental reason possess a motivational hold over agents because ends of skill and 
happiness are ones that humans naturally seek; it appeals to the sensible part of our human 
constitution.  Their normative authority is not constitutive of the purely rational part of human 
nature, but is derived from how we function as partly rational, partly sensible beings that are 
situated within phenomenal conditions.   
Thus, we can see how Kant answers :LOOLDPV¶FRQFHUQV about the motivational grip of 
hypothetical imperatives without appealing to a conception of autonomous rational agency as 
suggested by Korsgaard.79  Instrumental reasons have a motivational µgrip¶ on the desiderative 
components which are expressive of our sensible as well as practically rational nature.  Kant 
subsequently implies that, in cases where those practical principles fail to  convince the rational part 
of the human agent, their appeal to our sensible/desiderative side would ultimately compensate.80  
We can see that the opposite also holds: reason can contribute to our natural, sensible interest in 
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human well-being and happiness, and can help determine its empirical constituents for particular 
agents.   
This shows that theoretically rational components in instrumental choice or desire are 
generated without appeal to the categorical imperative.81  &RQWUD.RUVJDDUG¶VDFFRXQW the 
normativity of instrumental reason relies upon the active conceptualisation and practical application 
of causal empirical laws in order to, first, link a desired end (represented object) with the necessary 
means, and second, ascertain whether or not this theoretical connection is practically realisable.  
Moreover, if moral autonomy is taken as constitutive of all human rational agency, we fail to 
capture how theoretical normative sources of instrumental reason express a stance of openness and 
receptivity to the natural world which can in turn influence human purposive action.   
 
 
V. The Dialectical Nature of Practical Reason 
 
&HQWUDOWR.DQW¶VGXDOLVPEHWZHHQLQVWUXPHQWDODQGPRUDOUHDVRQLVDFRQIOLFWHGG\QDPLF
between universal morality and the individual pursuit of desire or contingently determined interests.  
The particularistic application of instrumental reason frequently opposes the universality of the 
categorical imperative.  This open-ended oscillation between the subjective and objective lies at the 
heart of the humanistic use of both spheres of practical reason.  Kant therefore affirms two separate 
and legitimate but discordant spheres of human agency in alignment with our dual features. 
The predisposition of humanity and hypothetical imperatives are closely linked: such 
requirements correspond to ends which are characteristic of dualistic, rational imperfect beings, 
such as skill and happiness.82  Subjective ends of instrumental reason are rooted in the natural 
world, vary arbitrarily between individuals, and therefore cannot be the basis for a conception of 
universal morality.  Kant assumes a close connection between phenomenal experience, hedonistic 




Only experience can teach what brings us joy.  Only the natural drives for food, sex, rest, and 
movement, and (as our natural predispositions develop) for honor, for enlarging our cognition, and 
so forth, can tell each of us, and each only in his particular way, in what he will find those jobs; and, 
in the same way, only experience can teach him the means by which to seek them.  All apparently a 
priori reasoning about this comes down to nothing but experience raised by induction to generality, 
a geneUDOLW\>«@ZLOObe so tenuous that everyone must be allowed countless exceptions in order to 
adapt his choice of a way of life to his particular inclinations and his susceptibility to satisfaction 
and still, in the end, to become prudent only from his own RURWKHUV¶PLVIRUWXQHV83 
 
For Kant we can never shed our empirical selves: given our dualistic constitution part of us will 
always be rooted within the phenomenal world and be interested in our prudential happiness.  We 
need to be receptive to sensibly-given intuitions in order to know what particular inclinations 
successfully promote our pragmatic interests in happiness; we accumulate subjective prudential 
experience through the exploration of what desires promote pleasure and satisfaction.  Skilful or 
prudential ends ± and our motivation towards them ± DUHQRWPRUDOLQ.DQW¶VUHVWULFWHGGHILQLWLRQRI
the term.  Despite their non-moral status, these ends are nonetheless necessary for the kind of 
desiring and partially sensible beings we are.   
Instrumental reasoning ± including its constituents, application, and purpose ± must therefore 
be an exclusively anthropocentric exercise, particularly since a perfectly rational being is incapable 
of willing contrary to the moral law.  The word µsubjective¶ has two connotations for Kant: the 
more straightforward reading suggests a variety of individualised ends but on a deeper level the 
term stands for the predisposition of humanity in general, characterised by the limited rational 
capacities which set us apart from divine, non-desiderative beings.  In itself the theoretically 
rational aspects to human desire ± the rational capacity to aggregate disparate empirical experiences 
into the form of law ± is µsubjective¶ since this form of cognition is necessary only to the human 
understanding.  Moreover, the pragmatic interests which are constitutive of the instrumental use of 
reason already suggest that a perfectly rational, non-appetitive being (such as God) would never 
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need to use reason in such a way.  Consider what Kant states in his lectures on philosophical 
theology, dated 1783-4: 
 
Holiness is the absolute or unlimited moral perfection of the will.  A holy being must not be 
affected with the least inclination contrary to morality.  It must be impossible for it to will 
something which is contrary to moral laws.  So understood, no being but God is holy.  For every 
creature always has some needs, and if it wills to satisfy them, it also has inclinations which do not 
always agree with morality.  [...]  For every creature has needs which limit its inclination to make 
others happy; or at least these needs limit its ability to make such use of these inclinations that it 
may have not regard at all for its own welfare.  But God is independent benevolence.  He is not 
limited by any subjective ground, because he himself has no needs.84 
 
7KHDQWKURSRFHQWULFLW\RILQVWUXPHQWDOUHDVRQLVIXUWKHUVXSSRUWHGE\.DQW¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIWKH
human predisposition in the Religion.  In describing this predisposition Kant states in a footnote 
that an individual  
 
might apply the most rational reflection to these objects [of choice] ± about what concerns their 
greatest sum as well as the means for attaining the goal determined through them ± without thereby 
even suspecting the possibility of such a thing as the absolutely imperative moral law which 
announces to be itself an incentive, and, indeed, the highest incentive.85   
 
7KLVSDVVDJHGLUHFWO\FRQWUDGLFWV.RUVJDDUG¶VUHJUHVVVWUDWHJ\.DQWFODLPVWKDWWKHKXPDQDJHQW
can be engaged in means-end deliberation in isolation of the moral law and indeed, she may not be 
even practically cognisant of its normativity.  Even more strongly put, the distinction between 
heteronomy and autonomy signals that Kant believes that an agent can choose contrary to the 
categorical imperative, adopting instead a lesser, non-moral good rooted in empirical grounds of 
determination.  We can choose and pursue an end that is recognisably bad, even though we may 
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acknowledge that there is a better end that we ought to endorse according to the criteria of morality 
± and this would still qualify as instrumentally rational. 
The end of happiness fits this description of heteronomous willing: it is classified as a 
µsubjective¶ end because Kant rejects a conception of morality that is defined strictly in 
anthropocentric terms.  Kant criticises Greek eudaimonistic theories because he believes that 
proponents of these theories confuse prudential self-regard with the objective end of morality.86  
Self-love and individual inclinations are made the basis of morality ± RULQ.DQW¶VZRUGV
µsubjective determining grounds of choice [become] the objective determining ground of the will¶87  
The prudential interests we pursue through the instrumental use of reason often divert us away from 
the true end of morality.  Indeed, we often put our happiness before our moral duty; we prioritise 
the instrumental use of reason over our moral reason, and this leads to a dialectical relationship 
between the two forms of reason: 
 
Man feels in himself a powerful counterweight to all the commands of duty presented to him by 
reason as so worthy of esteem ± the counterweight of his needs and inclinations, whose total 
satisfaction he grasps under the name RI³happiness´.  But reason, without promising anything to 
inclination, enjoins its commands relentlessly, and therefore, so to speak, with disregard and neglect 
of these turbulent and seemingly equitable claims (which refuse to be suppressed by any 
command).  From this there arises a natural dialectic ± that is, a disposition to quibble with these 
strict laws of duty, to throw doubt on their validity or at least on their purity and strictness, and to 
make them, where possible, more adapted to our wishes and inclinations; that is, to pervert their 
very foundations and destroy their whole dignity ± a result which in the end even ordinary human 
reason is unable to approve.88 
 
Another way to understand this is to say that our instrumental reason directs us towards certain 
natural ends, but in doing so we are aware of how our conditional pursuit of happiness falls short of 
the moral demand.89  On one hand happiness is a necessary end to us as humans: this close 
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connection between instrumental reason and the predisposition of humanity is evident in the similar 
language Kant uses to describe both.  Inclinations towards µself love which is physical¶ exemplify 
the predisposition of humanity: both the human predisposition and the instrumental use of reason 
have an acquisitive, self-interested inflection and together, both depict the divisiveness, 
comparison, and multiplicity of ends among anthropomorphic beings.90  For something to be 
µREMHFWLYH¶LQ.DQW¶VVHQVH it has to apply universally to all rational beings;91 a priori, universal 
principles are laws which are valid for all rational beings without exception.  And as the earlier 
quotation shows, a divine being has no subjective needs or impulses. 
All of this appears to point to an irresolvable dialectic within practical reason: given our 
dualistic constitution humans inevitably seek happiness through hypothetical willing, yet this 
pursuit is wrought with ills and is inappropriate to our predisposition of moral personality.  It is 
therefore entirely possible ± and in fact a distinctly human characteristic ± to use reason in a way 
that is cRQWUDU\WRWKHPRUDOODZ,QFRQWUDVWWR.RUVJDDUG¶VFRRSHUDWLYHSLFWXUH.DQWSDLQWVD
much more antagonistic relationship between instrumental and moral reasoning.  This dialectic is 
important: in experiencing this tension Kant believes that individuals eventually come to recognise 
the need to constrain the egoistic, subjectivist tendencies which characterise the instrumental use of 
reason.  It is precisely this notion of moral constraint that is lost once the normativity of 




Some contemporary Kantians might object to my reading of Kantian instrumental reason on 
two grounds.  First, one might be tempted to say that my interpretation of Kant is too Humean: 
emphasis on the theoretically rational aspects of the normativity of instrumental reason seems too 
similar to an empiricist belief-desire model of practical motivation.  However, this worry is 
sidestepped once we fully understand how Kant adopts a cognitivist conception of desire.  Above I 
have highlighted how desire for Kant involves close interaction between passive reception of 
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sensory experience and the active formation of rational concepts.  It is not simply the case that 
means-end deliberation will involve some kind of belief and some kind of desire ± the actual 
desiderative faculty involves a large degree of rational activity in a theoretical sense.   
But while Kant departs from an empiricist model, it is important to note that the normativity 
of hypothetical imperatives does not necessitate moral assessment.  This fact highlights an aspect to 
.DQWLDQLQVWUXPHQWDOUHDVRQZKLFKLVQHJOHFWHGLQFRQWHPSRUDU\LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVQDPHO\.DQW¶V
acknowledgement that a stance of openness and receptivity to the phenomenal world is a requisite 
IRUVXFFHVVIXOSUDFWLFDODFWLRQ.DQWLVIUHTXHQWO\DFFXVHGRIOHJLWLPLVLQJWKHµGHJUDG>DWLRQRI@
QDWXUHDQGWKHZRUOGLQWRPHUHPHDQV¶92 based on the fact that the moral demand is strictly non-
empirically rooted.  But if we consider carefully how instrumental reason is important in its own 
right, it seems that Kant acknowledges how part and parcel of the human condition is to be 
receptive to, affected by, as well as engaged with, the natural world.  
Finally, one might object that embracing KaQW¶VGXDOLVPV results in a rather ominous gulf 
between the normativity of hypothetical imperatives and the categorical imperative.  On this view, 
WRUHDGSUDFWLFDOUHDVRQWKURXJKWKHOHQVRI.DQW¶VGXDOLVPVZHDNHQVWKHRYHUDOOFRKHUHQFHRIKLV
moral philosophy.  No material content appears capable of bridging this interminable gulf between 
our intelligible and sensible natures and their divergent practical manifestations.  One strategy 
would be to go along the interpretive path outlined by Korsgaard: practical reason is unified if the 
normative source of both instrumental and moral reason is founded on human capacities for creative 
self-legislating rational agency.  Based on its common normative source, both instrumental and 
pure practical reason interact in an unproblematic and cooperative manner towards individual 
happiness.  In turn, a degree of practical coherence is conferred onWR.DQW¶VRYHUDOOWKHRU\ 
Though this objection has some force, ultimately such coherence is purchased at a large 
philosophical cost ± namely at the expense of a moral framework which can restrict or critique 
instrumental reason.  .RUVJDDUG¶V account is in danger of collapsing morality into instrumental 
reason.  The normativity of the moral law becomes too closely connected to prudential or technical 
considerations.  This leads to misleading conclusions about the necessity of hypothetical 
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imperatives: the subjective necessity of these imperatives is indistinguishable from the objective 
necessity of the moral law.  The moral subtleW\RI.DQW¶VGXDOLVPVLVWKHUHIRUHORVW 
Thus, two important implications emerge out of my interpretive claim that instrumental 
reason shares much with theoretical reason.  First, it highlights a neglected dimension of 
instrumental reason: namely how the latter presupposes and requires a stance of openness towards 
WKHH[WHUQDOZRUOG7KLVQRWRQO\GHIOHFWVDFFXVDWLRQVWKDW.DQW¶VSUDFWLFDOSKLORVRSK\OHDGVWRWKH
wholesale devaluation of the natural environment, but also has significance in his political 
philosophy.93  Second, it helps prepare for the critical authority of moral reason.  Pure practical 
reason functions as a moral constraint on the potentially unfettered subjective interests of human 
LQVWUXPHQWDOUHDVRQLQJ8QGHUVWDQGLQJ.DQW¶VGXDOLVPbetween instrumental and pure practical 
reason helps us better appreciate his insight that moral reasoning fulfils a vital critical role in 
relation to human empirical interests.94   
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